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ABSTRACT: Over the last few years, the unconventional energy revolution has profoundly changed, 
if not the essence of global energy geopolitics, at least its narrative. This article analyses the impact 
of such a geo-economic shift for Southern European countries. Despite this development, North 
Africa will remain the main energy supplier for EU Mediterranean countries. As a consequence, 
the main shared strategic challenge regarding energy security will be the geopolitical deepening 
of a wider North Africa. To manage European energy interdependency with the Mediterranean 
Southern shore in such a changing context a new, credible and more appealing energy narrative 
for their southern energy partners should be developed. This article proposes some of the elements 
that could be included to successfully increase energy cooperation in the Western Mediterranean. 
KEY WORDS: Euromediterranean energy relations, energy security, unconventional energy 
revolution, global energy geopolitics, North Africa, European Union.
LA GESTIÓN DE LA INTERDEPENDENCIA ENERGÉTICA EN EL MEDITERRÁNEO 
OCCIDENTAL
RESUMEN: Durante los últimos años, la revolución energética no convencional ha cambiado 
profundamente, si no la esencia de la geopolítica global de la energía, al menos su narrativa. Este 
artículo analiza el impacto de este cambio geoeconómico para los países del sur de Europa. A su 
pesar el Norte de África continuará siendo la principal fuente de suministro energético para los 
países mediterráneos de la Unión Europea. En consecuencia, el mayor desafío estratégico común 
para su seguridad energética consiste en un Norte de África más amplio y profundo. Para gestionar 
la interdependencia energética europea con la orilla sur del Mediterráneo en un contexto cambiante 
como el actual, debe elaborarse un nuevo discurso energético creíble y más atractivo para los socios 
1 Gonzalo Escribano Francés, Director, Energy Program, Real Instituto Elcano (Madrid) and 
Associate Professor (Profesor Titular) of  Applied Economics, Spanish Open University (UNED, 
Madrid), <gescribano@rielcano.org>. Enrique San Martín González, Lecturer (Profesor Ayudante) 
of  Applied Economics, Spanish Open University (UNED, Madrid), <esanmartin@cee.uned.es>. This 
article updates previous versions of  part of  the research conducted for the IEEE (Instituto Español de 
Estudios Estratégicos, CESEDEN, Spain) and CEMISS (Centro Militare Di Studi Strategici, Italy) international 
research project “Energy geopolitics in the Mediterranean Region”, whose original Spanish version 
is available at <http://www.ieee.es/en/documentos/areas-tematicas/regiones-geopoliticas/2014/
DIEEET03-2014.html>.
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meridionales. En este artículo se proponen algunos elementos que podrían ser incluidos en una 
nueva narrativa para mejorar la cooperación energética en el Mediterráneo Occidental.
PALABRAS CLAVE: relaciones energéticas euromediterráneas, seguridad energética, revolución 
energética no convencional, geopolítica energética global, Norte de África, Unión Europea.
LA GESTION DE L´INTERDÉPENDANCE ÉNERGÉTIQUE DANS LA MÉDITERRANÉE 
OCCIDENTALE
RÉSUMÉ: Au cours des dernières années, si la révolution de l’énergie non conventionnelle n’a 
pas profondément changé l’essence de la géopolitique mondiale de l’énergie, elle a transformé au 
moins sa narrative. Cet article analyse l’impact de ce changement géo-économique pour les pays 
de l’Europe du Sud. L’Afrique du Nord continuent d’être la principale source d’approvisionnement 
en énergie pour les pays méditerranéens de l’Union Européenne. Par conséquent, le plus grand défi  
stratégique commun pour sa sécurité énergétique est une Afrique du Nord plus large et approfondie 
d’une perspective géopolitique. Pour gérer l’interdépendance énergétique européenne avec la rive 
sud de la Méditerranée dans un contexte si changeant, un discours énergétique plus crédible et plus 
attirant pour les partenaires du Sud doit être développée. Cet article propose quelques éléments 
qui pourraient être inclus dans un nouveau récit sur la coopération énergétique en Méditerranée 
occidentale.
MOTS CLÉS: relations énergétiques euro-méditerranéennes, sécurité énergétique, révolution non 
conventionnelle, géopolitique de l’énergie, Afrique du Nord, Union Européenne.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy geopolitics is by defi nition a quite static fi eld of  strategic thinking. 
The economic and political geography of  Mediterranean energy interdependency 
conform a natural energy space that has been rather stable over the last decades. 
Stability refers here to the fact that threats and opportunities, complementarities and 
confl icts, are projected in a highly stable analytical landscape: the geography of  energy 
resources, which evolves in a setting of  long-term investment projects and gradual 
technological progress. Threats and confl icts arise in a recurrent manner and under 
different form, but they tend to come from the same geographical origins. When 
they emerge abruptly and unexpectedly, a failure in risk evaluation has been made; if  
they affect the functioning of  national or regional energy markets, it is because the 
latter were ill-conceived to deal with energy security threats. However, over the last 
few years, the unconventional revolution has profoundly changed, if  not the essence 
of  global energy geopolitics, at least its narrative. It is true that energy geopolitics 
has been historically prone to fashions whose announced long-term impacts never 
materialise, at least no to the predicted extent. While these fashions receive a lot of  
attention from policy-makers, structural trends continue to unfold.
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This article nuances fi rst the impact of  such a geo-economic shift for Southern 
European countries. On the contrary, the following section argues that for these 
countries the main shared strategic challenge regarding energy security will be the 
geopolitical deepening of  a wider North Africa. The fi nal section concludes further 
arguing that managing European energy interdependency with North Africa in 
such a changing context requires developing a new, credible and more appealing 
energy narrative for their southern energy partners. It also emphasises the need for 
Southern European countries to be more pro-active in this regard in the European 
and bilateral policy domains, especially when a window of  opportunity for a more 
cooperative energy interdependency opens with the increasing uncertainty regarding 
Russian and Central Asian supplies.
Emphasising the North African dimension by no means dismiss the relevance 
of  other regional emerging dynamics that also affect Southern European countries, 
like energy developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, the growing relevance of  
the wider Atlantic basin or the Black Sea and the energy future of  the post-soviet 
space. Even more so if, as a consequence of  the current deterioration of  EU-Russian 
relations after the Ukraine crisis, the evolving energy scene in the Mediterranean 
becomes more crucial for European countries in need of  diversifying away from 
Russia and its “near abroad”.
II. WILL NORTH AFRICA FADE AWAY
 IN A SHIFTING GLOBAL ENERGY LANDSCAPE?
This section is devoted to identifying some key global drivers for energy 
geopolitics. On the global arena, the recent literature on energy geopolitics is plagued 
with analyses that predict the emergence of  a new balance in the international energy 
system due to the global impact of  the shale gas revolution and the expected effects 
of  the on-going unconventional oil revolution. This paper tries fi rst to nuance the 
direct and indirect impacts of  such developments on Southern European countries 
before addressing the North African dimension itself.
In Europe, most of  the attention has been given to Russia, balancing the policies 
of  engaging the country and diversifying away from it. Although Russia is the EU 
main energy supplier, its energy policy had always raised concerns due to the use of  
the energy weapon in his ‘near abroad’2. In the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, energy does 
2 LARSSON, for instance, had recorded more than fi fty incidents involving Russian use of  the 
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not seem to be playing the main role, but it was used fi rst to attract Ukraine to the 
Russian positions, with more than a 30% off  in the gas bill3 and, later on, to punish 
the pro-Western cabinet that reached offi ce after the Euromaidan events, cancelling 
the discount4. Precisely this crisis reminds Europe that its energy supply cannot rely 
solely in Russia. But to diversify energy supplies away from Russia has proven a 
hardly consistent and diffi cult endeavour, which has concentrated European strategic 
attention in the so-called ‘Great Game’ of  (petty) energy diplomacy in Central Asia. 
Nevertheless, being optimistic, it could be said that the results of  this policy has 
been limited, because Russia can still exert high political, economic and military 
pressure in the post-soviet space to its fullest extent, as we have seen very clearly in 
Transnistria (since 1992), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (2008) and Ukraine (2014).
Thus being North Africa the closest energy exporting region to the EU, a 
deepening in the Euro Mediterranean relations, as this paper advocates, seems to be 
the proper option to balance Russian geopolitical energy risk.
At a global level, the fi rst interesting trait in the emerging energy landscape is 
that it is biased towards the US unconventional energy power, while the alternative 
European vision of  a renewable, low-carbon future seems increasingly unappealing 
to strategic thinking. A renewables-based energy mix seems too much a soft 
energy power, whose appeal is fading in an energy world dominated by the hard 
narrative of  hydrocarbon resources, conventional or unconventional. When dealing 
with alternative energy futures, unconventional oil and gas are from Mars, while 
renewables are from Venus, to put it in Robert Kagan’s terms5.
This discourse was reinforced by the International Energy Agency-IEA- World 
Energy Outlook-WEO-20126, which projects a signifi cant geographical shift in 
hydrocarbon production to the benefi t of  North America and, lastly, to the US. 
‘energy lever’ between 1991 and 2005, more than any other country in the world (LARSSON, R.L., 
Russia’s Energy Policy: Security Dimensions of  Russia’s Reliability as an Energy Supplier, Swedish Defence 
Research Agency (FOI), Stockholm, 2006). The 2006 and 2009 ‘gas wars’ between Russia and Ukraine 
are two well-known cases where European gas supplies were affected after Russia cut off  gas supplies 
to Ukraine.
3 “Russia offers Ukraine major economic assistance”, BBC News, December 17, 2013. 
4 “Russia cancels Ukraine’s gas discount and demands $1.5bn”, The Telegraph, March 4, 2014.
5 ESCRIBANO, G., “Shifting towards what? Europe and the rise of  unconventional energy 
landscapes”, Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 82/2012.<http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/
wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/
ari82-2012_escribano_europe_unconventional_energy>.
6 IEA - INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, World Energy Outlook-WEO 2012. IEA-OECD, 
Paris, 2012.
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The summary of  the report was widely echoed by international media and attracted 
a lot of  attention from policy makers and energy analysts alike. In most analyses, 
US energy independence and even its emergence as an oil exporter were almost 
being taken for granted. On this assumption, it has been mechanically argued that 
US geopolitical interests in the Middle East will almost disappear. ‘Saudi’ America 
would lead world energy markets, pushing conventional producers to the fringe of  
the international geopolitical scene7. Europe would stay alone in providing for its 
energy security, increasing European energy vulnerability compared with the new 
unconventional US power.
But this unconventional boom, boosted to be a world geopolitical game changer 
only one year ago, was not seen by the IEA any more as a world revolution: the 
last WEO argues that, regarding oil, there will be effects only in the short and 
medium term («Light tight oil8 shakes the next ten years, but leaves the longer term 
unstirred») while the main key features of  the energy system keep going in the future 
(«The Middle East, the only large source of  low-cost oil, remains at the centre of  the 
longer-term oil outlook»)9. Nonetheless, the situation for some key players, like the 
US, could change dramatically in the future if  its predicted energy self-suffi ciency 
fi nally happens.
Although, unconventional resources have changed the balances of  global energy 
geopolitics, at least in the short and medium term, its development does not push 
conventional hydrocarbon suppliers to the fringe of  energy geopolitics. Some fi gures 
can help to nuance the present and future signifi cance of  unconventional resources. 
The 2013 WEO’s ‘New Policies Scenario’ projects that world unconventional oil 
production will reach 15 mb/d in 2035 (3.9 mb/d in 2011), compared with 65.4 
mb/d for conventional crude oil and 17.7 mb/d for natural gas liquids (68.5 and 
12.2 mb/d, respectively). Notwithstanding the fact that unconventional oil provides 
most additional production, together with natural gas liquids, it represents only 
15.2% of  2035 total liquids production, and is expected to be restricted to North 
America. Unconventional gas (mainly shale) would rise from 16% to 26% of  world 
7 “Saudi America. The U.S. will be the world’s leading energy producer, if  we allow it”, The Wall 
Street Journal, November 12, 2012.
8 Light tight oil (LTO) is a kind of  unconventional oil extracted using the same technology used 
to extract shale gas: horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (COGA - COLORADO OIL & GAS 
ASSOCIATION, “Oil Shale vs. Shale Oil, The Basics”, Denver (Colorado), 2013.
9 IEA - INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, World Energy Outlook-WEO 2013. 
IEA-OECD, Paris, 2013.
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production, accounting for close to half  of  world gas production increases between 
2011 and 2035. Half  of  it would come from China and the US.
These are big numbers that make for most of  the new production capacity. But 
they should be kept in perspective with its weight in global energy markets, which 
will remain dominated by conventional traditional producers through development 
of  existing fi elds and new conventional discoveries (including high cost deep water 
fi elds).
Table 1 shows that the Middle East represents roughly a third of  world oil 
production and exports (and almost a half  of  world oil proven reserves). When 
adding North African producers and Nigeria, the fi gures increase to over 40% 
of  world oil production and exports. Even more importantly, they own the only 
available spare capacity in the world, which gives Saudi Arabia and other smaller 
Gulf  producers the power to balance (or not) global oil markets by squeezing or 
preserving it. To date, Gulf  swing producers have been the last resort to compensate 
for strikes in Nigeria, hurricanes in the Gulf  of  Mexico, disruptions in Libyan 
production or the oil embargo on Iran, to name but a few.
In this context, sudden US strategic neglect of  the Gulf  region does not seem a 
plausible option. Especially so in the longer run, when the predominance of  Persian 
Gulf  reserves could prove more enduring than is currently though. It is true that 
US physical oil vulnerability would tend to be reduced. But the US already imported 
only 20% of  its oil from the Persian Gulf  in 2012, and this reduced reliance did not 
prevent a clear signal to Iran that any traffi c disruption in the Hormuz Strait would 
imply military action. Besides energy issues, the Middle East host a full menu of  
geopolitical nightmares, from Shia-Sunni tensions to the Arab-Israeli confl ict, in a 
region accumulates over 1 trillion US$ in reserves.
Another noticeable fi gure in Table 1 is the evolution of  production and 
exports between 2011 and 2012. Taking Libya out of  the picture, as its production 
is recovering from the civil war, the only region with a relevant increase in oil 
production (1,2 million barrels daily) is North America and, specifi cally, the US. This 
result could be transferred to oil exports, even with greater intensity, because if  US 
oil exports were not accounted for, world oil exports would have dropped. The main 
factor behind this production increase is, obviously, the unconventional revolution. 
However, it must be kept in mind that unconventional oil (and gas) is not produced 
due to a lack of  conventional crude (or gas); on the contrary it has been produced 
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Table 1: Oil production and exports, 2012 (Thousand barrels daily)
 Oil production Oil exports
Thousand barrels daily   (production-consumption)
 2012
Share of  
total
Increase 
2012-2011
2012
Share of  
total
Increase 
2012-2011
US 8.905 9,6% 1.037 -9.650 -17,4% 1.432
Canada 3.741 4,4% 215 1.329 2,4% 208
Mexico 2.911 3,5% -29 837 1,5% -61
Total North America 15.557 17,5% 1.222 -7.483 -13,5% 1.579
Venezuela 2.725 3,4% -40 1.944 3,5% -58
Brazil 2.149 2,7% -44 -655 -1,2% -108
Colombia 944 1,2% 29 670 1,2% 26
Argentina 664 0,8% -23 52 0,1% -37
Ecuador 505 0,7% 4 271 0,5% -4
Total S. & Cent. America 7.359 9,2% -89 827 1,5% -217
Russian Federation 10.643 12,8% 133 7.469 13,5% 48
Norway 1.916 2,1% -124 1.669 3,0% -131
Kazakhstan 1.728 2,0% -29 1.463 2,6% -52
United Kingdom 967 1,1% -147 -501 -0,9% -83
Azerbaijan 872 1,1% -47 779 1,4% -51
Total Europe & Eurasia 17.211 20,3% -240 -1.332 -2,4% 190
Saudi Arabia 11.530 13,3% 386 8.595 15,5% 286
Iran 3.680 4,2% -678 1.710 3,1% -770
United Arab Emirates 3.380 3,7% 61 2.660 4,8% 40
Kuwait 3.127 3,7% 247 2.651 4,8% 237
Iraq 3.115 3,7% 314 na na na
Qatar 1.966 2,0% 129 1.716 3,1% 114
Oman 922 1,1% 31 na na na
Total Middle East 28.270 32,5% 282 19.916 36,0% -81
Nigeria 2.417 2,8% -43 na na na
Angola 1.784 2,1% 58 na na na
Algeria 1.667 1,8% -17 1.300 2,3% -40
Libya 1.509 1,7% 1.030 na na na
Egypt 728 0,9% 1 -16 0,0% -25
Total Africa 9.442 10,9% 700 5.919 10,7% 536
China 4.155 5,0% 81 -6.066 -11,0% -390
Indonesia 918 1,1% -35 -647 -1,2% -51
India 894 1,0% -8 -2.757 -5,0% -172
Malaysia 657 0,7% 17 -40 -0,1% 2
Total Asia Pacifi c 8.313 9,6% 68 -21.467 -38,8% -959
Total World 86.152 100,0% 1.942 55.314 100,0% 704
Source: BP Statistical Review of  World Energy, June 2013.1
1 Notes: (1) no data provided for consumption in Iraq, Oman, Angola, Libya and Nigeria. (2) The 
increase in Libyan oil production during 2012 is due to the end of  the 2011 civil war.
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because there was a technological breakthrough that made it competitive enough to 
substitute other hydrocarbons that could have been produced.
Table 2 shows that changes in natural gas global balances are more dramatic due 
to the shale revolution, even if  its impact has not been so dramatic out of  North 
America due to social opposition, lack of  regulation, absence of  technological 
capabilities, and high investment requirements. A few countries have very important 
shale gas reserves (in descending order): China, Argentina, Algeria, Canada, the US, 
Mexico, Australia and South Africa. Each of  these countries has, at least, a 5% of  the 
Table 2: Estimated shale gas technically recoverable resources for selected 
countries, compared to existing reported reserves and production during 2011
 2011 natural gas 
production
January 1, 2013 
estimated proved 
natural gas 
reserves
2013 EIA/ARI 
unproved wet shale 
gas technically 
recoverable 
resources
 
trillion 
cubic 
feet
share of  
total
trillion 
cubic 
feet
share 
of  total
trillion 
cubic 
feet
share of  
total
Asia and Pacifi c 17 13,7% 504 7,4% 1.808 25,1%
China 4 3,2% 124 1,8% 1.115 15,5%
Australia 2 1,6% 43 0,6% 437 6,1%
Pakistan 1 0,8% 24 0,4% 105 1,5%
India 2 1,6% 44 0,6% 96 1,3%
Indonesia 3 2,4% 108 1,6% 46 0,6%
North America 32 25,8% 403 5,9% 1.685 23,4%
Canada 6 4,8% 68 1,0% 573 8,0%
United States 24 19,4% 318 4,6% 567 7,9%
Mexico 2 1,6% 17 0,2% 545 7,6%
South America & Caribbean 6 4,8% 269 3,9% 1.430 19,9%
Argentina 2 1,6% 12 0,2% 802 11,1%
Brazil 1 0,8% 14 0,2% 245 3,4%
Venezuela 1 0,8% 195 2,9% 167 2,3%
Paraguay - - 0 0,0% 75 1,0%
Colombia 0 0,0% 6 0,1% 55 0,8%
Chile 0 0,0% 3 0,0% 48 0,7%
Bolivia 1 0,8% 10 0,1% 36 0,5%
Middle East and North Africa 26 21,0% 3.117 45,6% 1.003 13,9%
Algeria 3 2,4% 159 2,3% 707 9,8%
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technically recoverable world reserves estimated by the US Energy Department10. 
Other countries come next, like Russia, Brazil, Venezuela, Poland, France, Ukraine, 
Libya, Pakistan or Egypt with at least 100 trillion cubic feet shale gas recoverable 
resources. While Southern European countries do not seem to have large shale 
gas deposits, Algeria, Libya and even Egypt, do have signifi cant ones. These three 
countries together account for almost 13% of  the identifi ed world shale resources, 
more than three times their conventional gas proved reserves. When and by whom 
those resources will be accessible is an issue that will be addressed in more detail 
in a coming section. However, in this respect the unconventional revolution does 
not directly affect energy security prospects of  EU Mediterranean countries, which 
under normal circumstances would keep Middle East and North African producers 
as their main energy suppliers.
Nevertheless, fi gures in Table 2 must be used with caution as the cumulative 
empirical knowledge in shale gas outside the US is limited. This could make estimations 
less accurate than in the US or when assessing conventional counterparts. If  we 
compare the last two EIA world estimations of  shale gas recoverable resources11 
differences, which could be attributed to an improved knowledge, are signifi cant. The 
most shocking ones are the complete dismissal of  the Norwegian unconventional 
10 EIA - ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and 
Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of  137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States, 2013, 
<http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas>.
11 Ibid. and EIA - ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, World Shale Gas Resources: An 
Initial Assessment of  14 Regions Outside the United States, 2011.
Libya 0 0,0% 55 0,8% 122 1,7%
Egypt 2 1,6% 77 1,1% 100 1,4%
Sub-Saharan Africa 2 1,6% 222 3,2% 390 5,4%
South Africa 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 390 5,4%
Europe 10 8,1% 145 2,1% 470 6,5%
Poland 0 0,0% 3 0,0% 148 2,1%
France 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 137 1,9%
Romania 0 0,0% 4 0,1% 51 0,7%
Former Soviet Union 30 24,2% 2.178 31,8% 415 5,8%
Russia 24 19,4% 1.688 24,7% 287 4,0%
Ukraine 1 0,8% 39 0,6% 128 1,8%
Total World 124 100,0% 6.839 100,0% 7.201 100,0%
Source: EIA (2013a), Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of  137 
Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States.
MANAGING INTERDEPENDENCY IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 2, janvier-décembre 2014, pp. 81-102 90
gas resources due to “the disappointing results obtained from three Alum Shale wells 
drilled by Shell Oil Company in 2011”12, and the fi fteen times increase in Venezuela 
due to better data and the inclusion of  associated gas. However, most changes are in 
the +/-35% range, a reasonable gap for such a new development.
In the Mediterranean Southern shore, Algerian unconventional recoverable 
resources were multiplied by three in the last report due to the inclusion of  six 
additional basins, reaching third position in the world ranking after China and 
Argentina. Libyan resources were downgraded due to the application of  a more 
severe organic threshold in shale gas estimation. Finally, Egypt was not assessed 
in the former report, but it is supposed to have resources of  similar magnitude 
than Libya. Notwithstanding, shale gas resources could vary quickly in the short and 
medium term as knowledge increase, especially outside the US, and more basins and 
more countries were assessed.
The impact on Mediterranean Europe’s energy security of  an eventual 
US strategic neglect of  the Middle East is also diffi cult to envision. First, while 
unconventional oil and gas is making the US an unconventional (energy) power, no 
country is immune to the evolution of  global markets. The main US’ energy risk 
is the economic cost of  a major disruption in global oil supplies13, and the fact is 
that global oil markets will remain dominated by conventional traditional producers. 
The 2012 WEO14 (p. 24) itself  warns that “reducing its oil imports will not insulate 
the United States from developments in international markets”. Second, the 2014 
Ukrainian crisis could have made a new geopolitical shift, as the US has realized that 
Europe cannot help to contain Russia if  this country supplies approximately one 
third of  European oil and gas imports and one fourth of  European consumption of  
oil and gas. Thus the US Government is willing to accelerate natural gas exports to 
Europe, reducing European energy dependence to undermine Russian infl uence15. 
It must be kept in mind that until recently the US was discussing the convenience to 
keep the gas for its own industries rather than exporting it abroad16.
12 Ibid., 2013.
13 CRANE, K., GOLDTHAU, A., TOMAN, M., LIGHT, T., JOHNSON, S.T., NADER, A., 
RABASA, A. and DOGO, H., Imported Oil and U.S. National Security, RAND, 2009, <http://www.rand.
org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG838.pdf>.
14 Op. cit. IEA, 2012.
15 “U.S. Hopes Boom in Natural Gas Can Curb Putin”, The New York Times, March 5, 2014.
16 NERA, Macroeconomic Impacts of  LNG Exports from the United States, NERA Economic consulting, 
Washington, DC, 2012. 
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Then, no sudden US strategic neglect of  the Gulf  region and the Middle East 
(or Europe) seems to be expected. Can the same be said on North Africa?
III. NOT FOR SOUTHERN EUROPE: THE GEOPOLITICAL DEEPENING OF A WIDER 
NORTH AFRICA
With such a soundtrack of  global unconventional transformations, Russian 
hopes and fears and Central Asian ‘chessboards’, in the last two years Southern 
Europe were repeatedly affected by energy disruptions from the apparently old-
fashioned energy pivot of  the Middle East and North Africa. The sequence of  events 
that followed is well known and certainly evokes more the immediacy of  dominoes 
than the subtleties of  chess. It can be noted in passing that while being perhaps less 
intellectually inspiring, domino is a tricky strategic game in which, contrary to chess, 
it is cooperation among players in the same team what makes the difference.
First, the 2011 Tunisian revolution affected the maintenance of  the Trans-
mediterranean gas pipeline exporting Algerian gas to Italy. Then, the Egyptian 
revolution threated Egyptian supplies and transit through the Suez Canal. Neither 
of  both materialised in serious disruption, but reminded Southern Europe the 
strategic importance of  their oil and gas imports from the Gulf  and North Africa. 
For instance, Spain’s Gas Natural Fenosa was affected by the Damietta gas export 
facility running out of  feedstock by Egyptian authorities, and many international 
companies are having diffi cult times in recovering arrears and debts from the 
Egyptian government. Civil war in Libya (February – October 2011) was a serious 
disruption which halted the country’s oil and gas exports, cutting almost 14% of  EU 
Mediterranean countries oil imports in 2010, including 23% of  Italian oil imports, 
16% of  French imports and 13% of  Spanish oil imports, besides 12% of  Italian gas 
imports and a minor share of  Spanish LNG imports17 (EUROSTAT, 2014).
Early after the war Libyan oil production recovered quickly but only to 75% 
of  pre-war levels: 1.65 mb/d in 2010 vs. 1.37 mb/d in 201218 (EIA, 2013b).At 
the beginning of  2013 oil production was affected sporadically by labour-related 
protest and power outages but in summer the situation worsened as protest evolved 
into more politicized issues leading to the closure of  the eastern oil exporting and 
17 EUROSTAT “Energy statistics - imports (by country of  origin) (nrg_12)”, European Union. 
Electronic database, 2014.
18 EIA - ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, “Libya country analysis brief ”, 2013.
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producing facilities. As a result Libyan oil production plunged to little more than 
200.000 b/d in February 201419. The Morning Glory story could illustrate perfectly 
Libya’s situation where Central government can not control neither the whole 
territory nor the exploitation of  its energy resources20.
In 2012, the Iranian embargo further forced Southern Europe, who was 
importing almost 5% of  its crude oil imports from Iran21, to rely on new oil imports 
from the Persian Gulf  and Nigeria. In parallel, an already deteriorating situation in 
the Sahel was worsened by the security vacuum left in southern Tunisia and Libya 
and the mounting pressure on Mali’s territorial integrity, forcing the French military 
intervention. In January 2013, a jihadist attack against the In Amenas gas plant, 
producing about 10% of  Algerian gas, signifi cantly reduced Algerian gas supplies to 
Italy through the Trans-Med22. 
However, together with energy security threats other trends, like Renewable 
Energy Resources (RES) deployment23, could entail a more positive outlook and help 
to forge a better compensated energy interdependency pattern between Southern 
Europe and its North African partners. In any case, since the beginning of  2011 
the evidence has been mounting that North African dynamics were rapidly evolving 
and that the energy sector could hardly spare those changes. Nevertheless, there 
is no need anymore, at least in the main EU Mediterranean countries, to make the 
case for the centrality of  North Africa in their respective energy external strategies. 
Until 2011, interdependency was managed and assured by (oligopolistic) markets 
19 Aljazeera, «Libya oil output dives after key fi eld shut», February 23, 2014.
20 The WallStreet Journal, «U.S. Forces Take Control of Libyan Tanker», March 17, 2014. 
21 In 2011 Iran supplied 37% of  Greek oil imports, 14% of  Spanish oil imports and almost 13% of  
Italian oil imports (Eurostat, op. cit.).
22 The energy related implications of  the In Amenas attack has been analysed in ARTEAGA, 
F. and ESCRIBANO, G., “La ocupación yihadista de la planta de gas de In Amenas en Argelia: 
¿consecuencia de la intervención en Mali o secuestro fallido?”, Real Instituto Elcano, Comentario Elcano 
8/2013, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_
CONTEXT=/elcano/Elcano_es/Zonas_es/Comentario_Arteaga-Escribano_ocupacion_yihadista_
gas_Argelia_Mali>.
23 The authors position regarding RES deployment in North Africa was explained in ESCRIBANO, 
G. and SAN MARTÍN, E., “Morocco, the European energy policy and the Mediterranean Solar Plan” 
in MORATA, F. y SOLORIO, I. (Eds.): European Energy Policy: An Environmental Approach, Cheltenham 
and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2012 or ESCRIBANO, G., MARÍN-QUEMADA, J.M. and SAN 
MARTÍN, E., “RES and risk: Renewable energy’s contribution to energy security. A portfolio-based 
approach”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 26, 2013. An estimation of  the impacts due to 
RES deployment has been analysed, for instance, in DE ARCE, R., MAHÍA, R., MEDINA, E. 
and ESCRIBANO, G., “A simulation of  the economic impact of  renewable energy development in 
Morocco”, Energy Policy, 46, 2012.
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and (sometimes confi dential) contracts. Popular revolts across North Africa and 
regime change in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya disrupted supplies from Tripoli to the 
Sinai Peninsula. But Algeria, the North African energy pivot, remained untouched, 
although at a considerable fi scal cost24. Would it be enough to assure North African 
stability as the unrest and turmoil remain in Libya and Egypt?
With this background, the extension of  the Sahel crisis to southern Mali and 
the terrorist attack to the In Amenas gas facility risked to develop into a long-time 
feared nightmare scenario. To put it in a classical geopolitical manner, Italian and 
Spanish energy ‘rimlands’ from the Mediterranean to the Gulf  of  Guinea would 
have been threaten simultaneously by a diffuse power emanating from the Sahelo-
saharian ‘heartland’, whose borders ‘suddenly’ reached their interest directly. In the 
Spanish case, the sum of  Algeria, Libya and Nigeria makes for 25% of  its 2012 oil 
imports, and over 55% of  gas imports.
There is a lot to nuance in this interpretation, especially in two regards. First, the 
generalisation of  terrorist attacks to energy facilities is diffi cult to foresee, especially 
in Algeria, which has extensive experience in dealing with terrorism and protecting 
energy infrastructures. Second, it remains to be seen the Libyan capacity to recover 
production levels and to exploit its un-explored potential under more transparent 
rules and institutions concerning domestic oil wealth redistribution and contract 
terms with international majors. Third, regarding the infl uence on Nigerian oil and 
gas supplies and Boko Haram capacity to disrupt them, or the extent to which a 
Somalia-like piracy situation could affect shipping in the Gulf  of  Guinea; however, 
the news on oil tankers being hijacked in international Western African waters show 
the plausibility of  such a scenario. Contrary to France, who depends heavily on 
Uranium imported from Niger, Spain barely imports 15% of  its uranium from that 
country, and neither Spain nor Italy nor Portugal have that highly signifi cant energy-
related mining interests in the Sahel.
In any case, and on a more positive stance, EU Mediterranean countries energy 
preferences call for a deepening and widening of  its energy interdependency pattern 
with North Africa, in the sense of  both further developing existing initiatives and 
projects, and diversifying its energy partnership to new areas. In security affairs 
24 ESCRIBANO, G., “A Political Economy Perspective on North Africa’s Transitions”, 
Working Paper 3/2013, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/
ca32b1004e5ec03db775bf077bddf9ce/WP3-2013_Escribano_political_economy_North_Africa_
transitions.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ca32b1004e5ec03db775bf077bddf9ce>.
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this may call for an integral strategy towards North Africa, the Sahel and even 
Western Africa, also widening geographically Southern Europe geopolitical borders; 
notwithstanding this, the following discussion will remain focused in North Africa. 
Emphasising the wider North African dimension by no means dismiss the relevance 
of  other regional emerging dynamics related to the EU Southern energy corridor in 
the East and to the wider Atlantic basin in the West25.
On the contrary, such differences could reinforce the complementarity of  
Southern Europe energy preferences in North Africa. If  Mediterranean Europe 
main shared strategic challenge regarding energy security is to be the geopolitical 
deepening of  a wider North Africa, both deepening and widening call for more 
resources devoted to cover more issues over a larger geographical area in a more 
integrated manner.
IV. MANAGING INTERDEPENDENCY: WHAT CAN SOUTHERN EUROPE DO?
The North African recent developments mentioned above entail a different 
pattern of  interdependency between Southern Europe and North Africa. This 
section address its policy implications for EU Mediterranean countries, which at 
least comprise the following actions: doing homework fi rst, consolidating current 
energy relations, launching new initiatives in new domains, improving energy 
governance, addressing energy-related hard security threats, and fi nally, to jointly 
develop a credible Euro-mediterranean energy narrative.
1. HOMEWORK FIRST
The new political economy balances26 imply deeper geopolitical consequences 
for Southern European energy supplies, either current hydrocarbon resources or 
even future RES fl ows. As shown in table 3, most of  the Mediterranean EU Member 
States share a relatively minor signifi cance of  European imports; a higher weight of  
Middle East supplies; and even more relevant for the purpose of  this paper, a higher 
interdependency with North Africa and West Africa. A drastic change in the wider 
North Africa’s energy scenario would imply an asymmetric energy shock for the EU 
25 SARTORI, N., “The Southern Gas Corridor: Needs, Opportunities and Constraints”, Documenti 
IAI nº 11/08 – June, Istituto Affair Internazionali, 2011; ISBELL, P., Energy and the Atlantic: The Shifting 
Energy Landscape of  the Atlantic Basin, The German Marshall Fund of  the United States, Washington 
DC, 2012.
26 ESCRIBANO, 2013, op. cit.
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Mediterranean member States. This is also true for other security dimensions, like 
terrorism, traffi cking, irregular migration or money laundering to name but a few.
The convergence of  Southern European energy preferences in the Western 
Mediterranean is so evident that the lack of  at least a shared refl ection strikes most 
observers. True, the energy dimension is not an exception regarding the diffi culties 
that Southern European offi cials have found in projecting their shared preferences 
towards the EU or in dealing with them bilaterally in a more fruitful manner, 
especially in the Mediterranean27 (POWELL, 2012). The geopolitical deepening of  
North Africa is perhaps the clearest example of  a shared strategic challenge that 
demands a much more proactive approach.
The Euro-Mediterranean energy dimension is certainly to be promoted in a 
more consistent manner at EU level, but the bilateral track is also to be explored 
more fully, from policy coordination to information exchanges. Other schemes, like 
the 5+5 or new initiatives between European Mediterranean members and third 
North African partners can also offer channels of  cooperation and merit to be 
explored. Coordination in the security dimension may also involve the 5+5 initiative 
and the NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, but also eventual emerging schemes to 
deal with the Sahel crisis and its North African spillovers.
All of  them require fi rst the awareness of  EU Mediterranean offi cials and 
policy-makers on the existence of  common preferences and shared challenges in 
the region. Second, the conviction that cooperation between Southern Europe is 
crucial because they are among the most affected EU countries by North African 
developments. This is especially so in the energy domain, where EU Mediterranean 
countries share the eventual consequences of  an asymmetrical energy shock 
coming from the region. And third, the will to invest political capital to change 
the prevailing discourse on Euro-mediterranean energy cooperation. This includes 
acting by example rather than by default, and doing things together. EU Southern 
Mediterranean countries like France, Italy, Portugal and Spain need to recover the 
initiative in EU’s Mediterranean policy, and energy not only makes no exception, but 
signals a clear opportunity to cooperation. A joint agenda could include the items 
that follow, each of  them offering distinct opportunities to do things together.
27 POWELL, C., ‘The pain in Spain: Madrid and the European Financial Crisis’, in Various Authors, 
Southern Europe in Trouble. Domestic and foreign policy challenges of  the fi nancial crisis. Mediterranean Paper 
Series, The German Marshall Fund of  the United States, Washington DC, 2012. 
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Table 3: Characterisation of  EU countries according to its energy suppliers, 2005
PROFILE 1: 
Predominance of  intra-European imports (76% on average) and the moderate weight of  
Russia and Central Asia (11% on average) and North Africa (5% on average) 
Austria Ireland Slovenia
Belgium Luxembourg Sweden
Denmark Malta United Kingdom
PROFILE 2:
Signifi cant dominance of  intra-European imports (44% on average) but high Russian and 
Central Asian imports (41% on average) and a moderate contribution from the Middle East 
(6%) and North Africa (5%) 
Czech Republic France Latvia
Estonia Germany Netherlands
PROFILE 3: 
Clear Russian predominance (81% on average with Central Asia) and moderate European 
weight (17%) without signifi cant participation from other areas 
Bulgaria Hungary Poland
Finland Lithuania Romania
Slovakia
PROFILE 4: 
Minor signifi cance of  European imports (22% on average) with high weight of  the Middle 
East (27%), North Africa (17%), and Sub-Saharan Africa (8%) 
Cyprus Italy Spain
Greece Portugal
Source: ESCRIBANO (2010)28. Note: the clustering refer to total energy imports: oil and gas and their 
products, coal, biomass and electricity.
2. CONSOLIDATING ENERGY RELATIONS AND LAUNCHING NEW INITIATIVES 
IN NEW DOMAINS
Over the years, Euro-mediterranean energy relations have developed to include 
several issues from physical interconnections (the Euro-mediterranean electricity 
and gas rings) to normative issues included in both Barcelona’s Association 
28 ESCRIBANO, G., “Convergence towards Differentiation: The Case of  Mediterranean Energy 
Corridors”, Mediterranean Politics, 15 (2), 2010. This issue was analysed more deeply in ESCRIBANO, 
G., MAHÍA, R. AND DE ARCE, R., “The Europeanization of  EU member states energy security 
policies: convergence patterns” in MARÍN-QUEMADA, J.M., GARCÍA-VERDUGO, J. AND 
ESCRIBANO, G. (Eds.), Energy security for the EU in the 21st century: Markets, geopolitics and corridors, 
Routledge, New York and Oxford, 2012.
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Agreements and European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans. The Union for 
the Mediterranean added the Mediterranean Solar Plan and recent EU renewable 
regulation explicitly contemplates RES fl ows from the region. There has been an 
increasing energy dialogue in different areas, from energy regulators (MEDREG) 
to companies (Observatoire Méditerranéen de l’Énergie-OME). As a result, a good 
relationship has been built between regulators, grid operators and utilities across the 
Mediterranean.
A detailed account of  the various initiatives and its evolution is out of  the scope 
of  this paper. Its only point here is the need to consolidate such process and to 
explore the opportunities it already offers. This includes reviewing its successes and 
failures, and re-designing its foundations wherever needed. The existence of  such 
foundations and the closing of  the identifi ed gaps between expectations and measures 
should be highlighted in any narrative aimed at renewing the energy discourse for 
the region. A joint refl ection by Italy and Spain on the existing initiatives should be 
conducted at the various EU, multilateral and bilateral levels.
Wherever any signifi cant gap in the existing energy framework is identifi ed, EU 
Mediterranean countries should try to jump in by launching new initiatives. This can 
entail deepening interdependency in some fi elds where cooperation already exists, 
like physical interconnections or technical harmonisation; or widening its scope to 
cover new issues, like extending interdependency to RES deployment or securing 
energy infrastructures. It would be interesting for Mediterranean Europe to conduct 
the exercise of  identifying new domains on which it could have convergent energy 
preferences in North Africa and the ways to advance them. This include diversifying 
economic relations within the energy sector (RES deployment, cross-investments, 
facilities’ security…) and away from it, to build a bilateral relation less polarised on 
oil and gas imports.
Broadening the agenda and revitalising it should however be balanced with the 
need to provide real progress and not just rhetoric. The problems of  both deepening 
and widening are well known for observers of  EU integration, who tend to think 
that one happens at the expense of  the other. This tend to be true under the 
assumption of  fi xed resources, but this paper argues that the new geopolitical weight 
of  a wider North Africa do need more resources to conduct both a deepening and 
widening of  EU policies towards the region. Regarding the renewal of  the EU’s 
energy discourse, the idea that energy cooperation has ‘solid’ foundations need to 
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be complemented with the idea that there is dynamism and a broad potential to do 
more things together in the future and the operational and fi nancial capacity to attain 
more ambitious goals.
3. FOCUSING ON THE GOOD GOVERNANCE OF ENERGY RESOURCES
good energy governance is a key driver of  the future evolution of  energy security 
in the Western Mediterranean, and should be included in any credible narrative on 
energy interdependence. The time-consistency of  North African energy policies 
will critically depend on whether energy governance is improved to provide a more 
inclusive and sustained growth and investment pattern, or remains anchored in 
internal and external power politics and ineffi ciencies. For this paper’s purposes, 
energy governance has two distinct aspects: the domestic dimension of  escaping the 
resource curse, and the international imperative of  avoiding resource competition 
between international oil companies.
Contrary to the political science concept of  Resource Curse, economists like to 
approach energy governance as a (Dutch) Disease. There are different reasons and 
implications behind each fi gure, but a fundamental one is that ‘curses’ requires some 
kind of  witchcraft while ‘diseases’ can have cure. Oil and gas producers, including 
Algeria, have learned a lot on the macroeconomic management of  its resource wealth 
over the last decades, and macro-prudency and monetary sterilisation, together with 
oil-wealth funds and micro-economic reforms have allow to obtain better economic 
results than in the past.
However, institutional reforms lagged again to make the management of  these 
resources more transparent and inclusive, and were not able to prevent rent-seeking 
behaviours at both the economic and political levels. Resource allocation has been 
led by clientelism, rather than effi ciency, and redistribution by the way of  subsidies 
and public employment distorted markets and ultimately became a political trap. 
Political distortions also affect the international oil companies’ ecosystem and 
citizen’s perceptions on the role they perform in their countries. Greater transparency 
adds legitimacy to foreign energy companies that behave according to rules like 
the ones provided by the Natural Resource Charter (NRC) or Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI)29.
29 The description of  these initiatives could be seen in their webpages: <http://naturalresourcecharter.
org/> and <http://eiti.org/>.
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In this regard, invocating good energy governance (including subsidies) in North 
African producers presents a strand of  actions that include the preferences of  North 
African citizens on transparency and rule of  law, a fair redistribution of  resource 
wealth and making it work to economic development; only then government’s 
needs to redesign energy policies and international companies’ claims on access to 
resources can be addressed in a political sustainable way. For the latter, medium 
regional powers like Italy and Spain can expect to obtain better results in a rule of  
law scenario than in an energy sector dominated by political infl uences.
4. ADDRESSING ENERGY-RELATED HARD SECURITY THREATS
One of  the most pressing North African energy security challenges for EU 
Mediterranean countries is to address the issue in a sensible way that helps to secure 
supplies without over-securitising energy relations. One way to approach it is what 
can be called ‘outward securitisation’, meaning by that both projecting security risks 
towards third countries and confi ning security cooperation to borders.
To date, the logic of  bilateral dependencies has overplayed the opposing 
preferences of  producers and consumers. The geopolitical transformations in the 
region offer an opportunity to overcome such a reductionist approach by making 
explicit how interdependency spills over North African countries’ southern 
neighbours. It is not producer countries that threat security of  supply, and consumer 
countries that threat security of  demand. Instead, both are threaten by third parties, 
reinforcing the logic of  interdependency vis-à-vis shared risks and making the need 
for cooperative security self-evident and more palatable from a political perspective. 
However, given that security cooperation is a highly sensitive issue, pragmatism 
should prioritise measures at the border, not inside the countries themselves. 
Measures can combine different aspects, from training to information-sharing 
initiatives. For instance, ESCRIBANO and PALLONI30 have shown how training 
formats have been experimented with some success within the framework of  the 
Africa Partnership Station and could be pursued within the 5+5 Initiative in the 
domain of  oil platform and maritime security. In both cases the training would 
constitute a capacity building opportunity regarding operational skills (like force 
protection equipment, platform defence equipment & facility protection), and 
30 ESCRIBANO, G. and PALLONI, E., “Energy as a driver for strategic cooperation in the Western 
Mediterranean”, in CEMRES 2012 RESEARCH PROJECT, The constitutive factors of  a Strategy for 
maintaining a harmonious Security in the Western Basin of  the Mediterranean, CEMRES, 2012.
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information management (Maritime Domain Awareness –MDA– technology and 
information sharing systems).
Following the events in the Sahel, it could be useful to think of  even more 
ambitious security cooperation, like a SIVE31-like system for North African Saharian 
and Sahelian borders. Drone-sharing in the region is another option. The US African 
Command (USAFRICOM) have been considering deploying drones to monitor the 
activities of  Boko Haram and their links with Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) 
and other jihadist terrorist groups for some time. Recent developments in the region 
have result in the US fi nally establishing a drone base in Niger32. But the US has 
already other capacities in the region and this has not impeded the Algerians to 
comply on the lack of  information coming from them. Cooperative security does 
not only require agreeing on deploying technical capacities: they have to be shared 
to be fruitful, which in turn implies setting procedures and priorities in an equally 
cooperative manner.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS: DEVELOPING A CREDIBLE ENERGY NARRATIVE
The previous sections have tried to show why North Africa remains a key 
energy partner for EU Mediterranean countries is spite of  a rapidly changing energy 
global landscape; that in fact, North African energy geopolitics are becoming more 
important and demanding for these European countries; that new issues should be 
included in a comprehensive strategy for a geographically expanded North Africa; 
and that EU Mediterranean countries do share energy preferences in the Western 
Mediterranean that are barely refl ected in common positions or even common 
strategic thinking towards the region. This situation overlaps with current economic 
crisis that make it diffi cult for policy-makers and public opinions to devote resources 
and attention to what is going on in their southern neighbourhood.
Things are defi nitively changing in North Africa. New social, political and 
economic balances are in the making, and Europe as a whole, and specifi cally, EU 
Mediterranean countries, should be prepared to offer a credible vision of  how 
energy interdependency can be managed to be mutually benefi cial. The Arab Spring 
makes imperative that these benefi ts reach the citizens, and the situation in the Sahel 
31 Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia del Estrecho (Strait of  Gibraltar Integral Surveillance System), 
which has proven very effi cient in surveiling the North African coast.
32 Stratrisks, “US Establishes Drone Base in Niger, Targets Regional Militia”, January 30, 2013.
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clearly needs a security response. Collective energy security is made of  different 
pieces combined in an appropriate manner. EU Mediterranean countries should 
think about promoting a new approach towards energy cooperation in the Western 
Mediterranean. To be convincing in both North Africa and Europe, they need to 
develop a credible narrative for energy cooperation in the region that can match 
their preferences. Here are some of  its, admittedly speculative, possible elements:
• Regional and sub-regional: EU Mediterranean countries should work together in 
promoting and supporting energy initiatives in the Western Mediterranean 
along the lines presented above, either under Euro-mediterranean, 5+5, 
Mediterranean Dialogue, bilateral or multilateral formats. Regional visions 
are always more appealing and can have more political traction, but the 
sub-regional and bilateral dimensions are the key to fi ne-tune cooperative 
schemes and to reduce transaction costs. The main elements of  any of  such 
vision should be consistent among initiatives in order to project a coherent 
global strategy. Polycentric governance requires strong links among the 
nodes.
• Interdependency rather than dependency: Interdependency is a more propitious 
environment to cooperation than dependency, and European Mediterranean 
countries should base their regional energy cooperation in providing such 
an alternative narrative of  cooperative interdependency rather than the 
competitive dependency approach.
• Development instead of  rent: European preferences are consistent with 
promoting energy as a driver for development and cooperation in North 
Africa. EU Mediterranean countries are interested in preserving socio-
economic stability in the region and accessing its energy resources under 
transparent rules and procedures.
• Democratic energy governance: after the Arab Spring energy resources’ 
management will be increasingly watched by producer countries’ population. 
Energy policies will be subjected to more open scrutiny, which is essentially 
a good thing, but risks leading to a more populist stance. Emphasising good 
governance allows for compromise among different institutional elements.
• Sustainability: the regional energy narrative should be refreshed by infusing 
sustainability through RES deployment and energy effi ciency, together with 
linked dimensions like technological transfers, training and technical and 
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industrial cooperation. RES are more security-neutral than conventional 
energies and provide innovation opportunities and a more soft approach 
to energy cooperation. Current diffi culties in the Mediterranean Solar 
Plan illustrate the lack of  a common narrative in such a symbolic area as 
renewable energies and sustainability.
• Cooperative energy security: projecting security threats beyond North African 
geographical borders allows for more cooperation space in North Africa 
itself. True, hard energy security threats should be addressed, but solutions 
should seek consensus and results and be embedded in both a broader and 
well diversifi ed strategy, and operational measures to improve security in the 
region. It would be advisable, however, to confi ne hard security issues to 
specialised forums like the NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, 5+5 Initiatives 
and bilateral relations.
• A Pan-Mediterranean vocation for the Energy Community Treaty: by contrast, 
most of  the soft elements mentioned above could be addressed under 
the framework of  an extended Energy Community Treaty, which could 
be opened selectively to North African countries. Morocco could be the 
fi rst country to benefi t from it, something that entails interesting long-
term prospects, like participating in the European energy single market or 
even export virtual ‘green electricity’ through green certifi cates. Offering 
prospects of  acceding the EU’s energy market to oil and gas producers 
in exchange of  good energy governance and better sustainable economic 
development performance can help to provide a warmer ecosystem to pan-
Mediterranean energy cooperation.
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